This paper studies self-reinforcing mechanisms in multi-technology industries, i.e. industries in which technological lock-in does not occur and several technologies continue to coexist. The purpose of this paper is to investigate what kind of self-reinforcing mechanisms can be present in such industries and explain how multiple paths can coexist and interact in a context of self-reinforcement and, ultimately, path dependency. Building on the empirical example of the lighting industry, the paper shows that all previously recognized types of self-reinforcing mechanisms can be present in a multi-technology industry. However, in addition to the path-internal positive feedbacks and cross-path negative externalities identified in single-path settings, multi-technology industries also experience positive cross-path externalities that create a symbiotic relationship between alternatives and allow for the reproduction of the same development pattern across technologies. Due to the existence of such non-negative technology interactions, multi-technology industries can be path dependent while still retaining technological variety. concept that over the past 30 years has been developed to explain historically bounded development processes (Arthur 1994; David 1985) Most researchers agree that the main self-reinforcing mechanisms are coordination effects, complementarity effects, expectation effects and investment and learning effects (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013). These mechanisms have been described both at the micro-level of organizations (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009) and at the meso-level of technological fields and industries (Arthur 1989; Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) . This paper is focused on technological path dependency at the industry level, where self-reinforcing mechanisms can be addressed by recognizing development patterns that are common to most, if not all, industry actors (e.g. Mazzoleni 1997).
Introduction
The evolution of technologies and industries often shows signs of self-sustained development patterns, where some choices or events are reproduced over time (Arthur 1994; Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) . In technology development studies, the driving forces behind this kind of processes are referred to as self-reinforcing mechanisms (Araujo and Harrison 2002) . Together with persistence, such self-reinforcing mechanisms are the key components of path dependency (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009 ), a to be a causal connection between earlier and later events. This is what is normally referred to as self-reinforcing mechanisms (cf., e.g. Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013; Koch, Eisend, and Petermann 2009; Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009; Vergne and Durand 2010) and what is in focus in this paper.
In some recent path dependency literature, it has been argued that lock-in is also a necessary feature of path dependent processes (Vergne and Durand 2010) . The argument is that self-reinforcing mechanisms are associated with a gradual decrease in available options until only one (often inferior) technology remains (Arthur 1989; Cowan and Gunby 1996; David 1985) . 1 Indeed, in this literature, a path is normally seen as the result of an irreversible selection of an individual, "winning" technology at the level of a technology field or industry (Bergek and Onufrey 2014) . However, the main argument of this paper is that persistence in combination with self-reinforcing mechanisms can exist also in multi-technology industries, i.e. industries where several technologies coexist over sustained periods of time. This implies that we challenge the notion that lock-in is the only possible outcome of path dependent processes and instead focus on understanding how several paths can survive in parallel at the industry level and, more specifically, the role of self-reinforcing mechanisms in this.
Self-reinforcing Mechanisms: Technology Adoption vs. Technology Development
As indicated above, self-reinforcing mechanisms can be defined as a set of forces or processes that reproduce a particular pattern of events, choices, or activities over time (Araujo and Harrison 2002; Mahoney 2000; Page 2006 ) and explain the development from a set of initial conditions to a specific outcome (Dobusch and Kapeller 2013) , for example, increasing stability and lock-in (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) . When self-reinforcing mechanisms are in place, each step taken in a certain direction makes it more probable that further steps will be taken in the same direction (Pierson 2000) , i.e. once an initial choice is made, self-reinforcing mechanisms lead to repetition of that choice and eventually make it self-sustained (Araujo and Harrison 2002; Arthur 1994) . They are, therefore, often described as feedback loops (Arthur 1994; Koch, Eisend, and Petermann 2009) or virtuous/vicious circles (Pierson 2000) .
The earliest studies of path dependency focused on "increasing returns to adoption" of technologies. Both Arthur (1989) and David (1985) studied cases of technology competition in which historical contingencies in combination with increasing returns to adoption led to market dominance of potentially inferior technologies (QWERTY in the example of David and VCR cassette recorders in the case of Arthur). These early examples of technology adoption are still widely cited (e.g. Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010; Kay 2013; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; Page 2006; Pierson 2000; Vergne and Durand 2010) and have become something of a hallmark of path dependency research. This implies that self-reinforcing mechanisms are primarily associated with technology adoption, i.e. the pattern that they reproduce is the adoption of one specific technology or product before other alternatives.
In later writings, the adoption focus has become less pronounced. Most noticeably, the concept of increasing returns to adoption has been gradually replaced with more general terms, such as self-reinforcing mechanisms, which are not only related to technology adoption and distribution, but can include technology development in firms and industries as well. For example, in their recent conceptualization of path dependency, Dobusch and Schüßler (2013) consider the organizational context, which includes (but is not limited to) technology development-related mechanisms. Furthermore, there are some empirical studies of path dependency in technology development, for example, case studies of technology development in firms (e.g. Araujo and Harrison 2002) and industry consortia (e.g. Sydow et al. 2012) as well as studies of organizational path dependency (Schreyögg, Sydow, and Holtmann 2011; Sydow, Schreyögg, and Koch 2009 ). Nevertheless, the idea of technology development-related self-reinforcing mechanisms has been much less elaborated on and remains much less explicit in the path dependency literature than adoption-related mechanisms. This is somewhat problematic when considering that the wider technology management literature indicates that some kind of self-reinforcing mechanisms are in place that may result in a repeated pattern of actions also with regard to technology development. In particular, it emphasizes the tendency of established companies to focus their development efforts on established product architectures (Henderson and Clark 1990) and performance trajectories (Dosi 1982; Tushman and Anderson 1986) or, more generally, to be characterized by a "local" search behavior (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003; Stuart and Podolny 1996) . Repeated choices are, thus, made in terms of allocation of resources to the exploitation of established technologies and performance attributes, rather than the exploration of new technological paths (Christensen and Bower 1996; March 1991; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001) .
In the following, we elaborate further on this idea by explicitly distinguishing self-reinforcing mechanisms that are manifested in technology adoption from those manifested in technology development.
Four Types of Self-reinforcing Mechanisms
In the previous literature, four main types of self-reinforcing mechanisms are generally discussed (although sometimes under slightly different labels): coordination effects, complementarity effects, expectation effects and investment and learning effects. In line with the discussion in the previous section, we here argue that each of these mechanisms can manifest itself both as repeated technology adoption patterns and as repeated technology development patterns (see Table 1 ).
Coordination Effects
Coordination effects refer to the utility of following the same course of actions as others (Arthur 1994; Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) . The more actors make a similar choice or follow the same rule, the more efficient interaction between them can be (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009) . A well-known example of coordination effects-the righthand traffic rule (e.g. Arthur 1994)-illustrates that as long as everyone follows the same principle (drive on the right-hand side of the street), all the participants get the benefit of predictability and safety.
With regard to technology adoption, coordination effects take the form of direct network effects, i.e. the attractiveness and usefulness of a product increase with an increase in number of adopters (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) . Here, the size of the user network defines the utility of the product (Katz and Shapiro 1985) . With regard to technology development, coordination effects can be seen in, e.g., the advantages of following the same industry norms and standards and the coordination costs associated with switching to a new standard (Farrell and Saloner 1985) .
Complementarity Effects
Complementarity effects imply that the success of a technology depends on the development of complementary products, services, or processes (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013; Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009) .
With regard to technology adoption, complementarity effects are in place when the existence of high-quality complementary products positively affects the market adoption of a technology (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) . For example, spare parts or software often become cheaper and more readily available as the market expands, which increases the technology's attractiveness to new buyers and users (Farrell and Saloner 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1985) . With regard to technology development, companies may enjoy complementarity effects in the form of vertically related products (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) or resource complementarities originating from, e.g., related knowledge, manufacturing facilities, or distribution channels (Teece 1986 ). Such complementarities make it more attractive for suppliers to continue to exploit and profit from established technologies than to develop new ones.
Expectation Effects
Expectation effects are based on people's inclination to change their expectations depending on the expectations of others, i.e. individual preferences are to some extent based on others' future choices (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013; Sydow, Schreyö gg, and ). This kind of "going along" with others (Arthur 1994) makes expectation effects similar to coordination effects discussed above. However, under expectation effects, agents do not derive any real utility, but rather seek a "softer" type of advantage-being on the winning side or avoiding being an outsider (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009) . With regard to technology adoption, such legitimacy-seeking behavior is seen when people adopt a technology because of a need for social belonging (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009) or in order to create a positive image of themselves among their peers (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012) . With regard to technology development, expectation effects manifest themselves as, for example, institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) or the diffusion of best practices (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009 ).
Investment and Learning Effects
Investment and learning effects refer to the accumulation of resources and knowledge that are specific to a particular product or technology and cannot be easily transferred to or reused in alternatives (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) .
With regard to technology adoption, an initial choice of a specific technology makes a user less prone to buying an alternative. Especially when high-tech products are concerned, users have to invest in training and competence-building when they adopt a new technology, and by repeating the same technology choice, they can exploit these investments further (Arthur 1996) . Users also learn over time how the technology works. They thereby get used to it and are likely to stay loyal when new versions are introduced (Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013). Other well-known investment and learning effects are economies of scale and experience, i.e. increased diffusion stimulates learning-by-using and learning-by-doing, which result in cost decreases and product performance increases and, thus, in further incentives for customers to adopt the technology (Arthur 1994; Cowan and Gunby 1996) .
With regard to technology development, the need for high initial investments (up-front costs or sunk costs) creates incentives to continue along the chosen path. Further, due to learning-by-doing effects related to technology development, i.e. when companies learn as a "by-product" of manufacturing (Arrow 1962) , more new problems and bottlenecks are identified, the more experience a company has of a technology. This sustains companies' interest in developing the same technology further and encourages local learning. In addition, companies develop skills and routines that are adapted to their current resources (Grant 1991) . Refining previous successes by focusing learning efforts on existing technologies requires less effort than exploring new options (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009 ), which is one reason why companies, as mentioned above, tend to engage in local search, i.e. to look for new opportunities close to their existing technology base (Foray 1997) .
Positive Feedbacks and Negative Externalities
As the definition suggests, the forces of self-reinforcement make a certain alternative increasingly attractive (Vergne and Durand 2010) . The term "positive feedbacks", which is sometimes used almost synonymously to the term self-reinforcing mechanism (e.g. Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013; Pierson 2000) , reflects this logic well. Positive feedbacks can be seen as internal to a particular technology in the sense that it is the choice to continue to adopt or develop a technology that is reinforced.
However, each positive feedback also has a "mirror" effect on other technologies. In the literature, these mirror effects are usually termed "negative externalities" and are described as self-reinforcing mechanisms that decrease the relative attractiveness of competing alternatives once a positive feedback loop has been established for one of them (Vergne and Durand 2010) . As Page (2006) showed using the QWERTY example, the same process that initiates a positive feedback if considered from the point of view of the "winner-to-be" creates a matching negative externality if considered from the point of view of other technologies. Negative externalities can therefore be seen as influences across paths.
Exploring Self-reinforcing Mechanisms in a Multi-path Setting: Research Questions
A common interpretation of positive feedbacks and negative externalities as mirror processes is that once one option experiences self-reinforcing mechanisms, all other alternatives will suffer and eventually exit the competition. This is in line with the single-path view put forward in most of the path dependency literature referred to above, which focuses on cases in which a single winning technology (or a more general pattern of activity) outcompetes all other alternatives and in which further developments proceed along a narrowing path, eventually resulting in a more or less irreversible lock-in situation (Bergek and Onufrey 2014) . For example, the concept of increasing returns to adoption has primarily been used to explain the outcome of technological competition in terms of lock-in to (inferior) technologies that for some (often more or less random) reason got ahead and stayed ahead (cf. Arthur 1989; Cowan 1990) . Once lock-in has occurred, actors are largely unable to deviate from the established path unless they are subjected to some kind of external shock (Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010; Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009; Vergne and Durand 2010) . Even if some of the literature acknowledges that new paths can be created (cf., e.g. Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010) , the coexistence of several technologies is generally considered to be a temporary phenomenon or an exceptional situation associated with inefficiency due to an inability to take a full advantage of economies of scale and network externalities (Foray 1997) .
However, this view does not correspond well with an empirical reality where there are multi-technology companies (Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt 1997; Granstrand and Sjö lander 1990) , widely defined sectors (Rao, Vemuri, and Galvin 2004) and industries (Onufrey 2014) in which several technological paths coexist and are sustained over time. One example of the latter is the lighting industry, where a number of different lamp technologies have been developed and introduced since the 1870s and now coexist in the major lighting companies as well as in the market place. In spite of its multi-technology character, this industry is characterized by substantial technological persistence as well as by an overall stability in terms of leading companies (Bergek and Onufrey 2014) . It, thus, shows strong signs of path dependency, although it cannot be described as locked in to one technological path. To allow for that, self-reinforcing mechanisms-a central component of path dependency-need to be different in multi-technology industries as compared with industries characterized by lock-in to one single technological path. The difference can be either in the mechanisms associated with each path, or in the ways paths affect each other (i.e. cross-path externalities), or both.
Against this discussion, we will answer the following research questions in order to achieve the purpose of this paper:
(1) What kind of self-reinforcing mechanisms (with respect to different types and technology development vs. adoption manifestations) can be present in a multitechnology industry, i.e. in cases where the outcome is not lock-in to one single technology? (2) What is the role of self-reinforcing mechanisms in enabling the survival of several technological alternatives, i.e. in avoiding technological lock-in?
Research Design
Path dependency is an increasingly popular concept among scholars which opens for a number of debates that concern not only theoretical boundaries and contents of the concept, but also appropriate methodological tools (Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010; Vergne and Durand 2010) . As Dobusch and Kapeller (2013) have recently summarized, no established methodology can be considered as especially appropriate for studying path dependency in general or self-reinforcing mechanisms in particular. Instead, "the identification and investigation of particular positive feedback effects and their impact on the overall development is (considered to be) an empirical task, one that allows for applying a broad repertoire of methods" (Dobusch and Kapeller 2013, 295) . In this paper, we use the single retrospective case study methodology where we apply a theory-based conceptualization of self-reinforcing mechanisms to a multi-technology industry.
Case Selection
Case selection was a result of theoretical sampling. The appropriate industry should satisfy two main requirements. First, it should be characterized by a presence of several coexisting technological paths. Second, the industry should be path dependent. However, in a strict sense, an industry can be defined as path dependent only after self-reinforcing mechanisms have been identified (Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009 ), which is the task to be accomplished in this paper. Therefore, we decided to study an industry that at least had shown strong signs of path dependency in terms of, e.g., persistence and historically bounded development: the lighting industry (cf. Bergek and Onufrey 2014).
Data Collection
Data were collected in several steps. First, technical reports, industry studies and annual reports of leading manufacturers were studied in order to create an overall picture of the industry. In addition, at an early stage of data gathering, we conducted a number of interviews with representatives from industry actors. The interviews were used to confirm general patterns of industry development and provide specific information with regard to some of the mechanisms. For example, interviews with producers (Osram and Philips)
were focused on the commonalities and differences between different lighting technologies; wholesalers (IKEA and ICA) and a construction company (Lambertsson) were interviewed with regard to their view on customer preferences and supplier relations; and an interview with an industry association (Global Lighting Association) highlighted relevant technology development issues at the industry level. In all interviews, the influence of light-emitting diodes (LED) technology on the lighting industry was discussed. Second, we proceeded with looking for repeated patterns and root-cause relationships based on which we could identify self-reinforcing mechanisms. During that step, the following data sources were studied:
( Finally, a focused search with respect to particular mechanisms used as examples in the paper (e.g. patent searches in order to illustrate reference patterns) was performed in order to ensure their reliability.
Appendix 1 summarizes the data sources referred to in the article. For each source, it is clarified what kind of information was used as an input for analysis and how data were interpreted. As can be seen in the Appendix 1, most of the processes underlying the identified mechanisms are referred to across several different sources. This confirms that the mechanisms discussed in the paper are well established and generally recognized. 2 With the exception of Menanteau and Lefebvre (2000) , the sources did not operate with the notion of self-reinforcing mechanisms, but rather presented reasons for a continued dominance of incandescent lamps or barriers for other technologies. The sources also tended to focus on one technology, without much cross-technology comparison. It was, thus, an analytical task (performed for the purpose of this paper) to apply the path dependency theoretical framework to the data in order to identify and characterize self-reinforcing mechanisms and make cross-technology connections (e.g. to discover mechanisms that first affected CFL and were later reproduced with LED). 2 This also allowed us to assume that the identified mechanisms would be recognized by most industry participants. Together with information gained through attendance at the industry conference (Strategies in Light Europe in Munich in 2012), the interviews confirmed that industry participants share the same basic view of technology development, market trends and challenges. The number of interviews was too limited to allow for a full account of the perceptions of all industry participants, but this limitation did not affect the purpose of this study as, by challenging the idea of lock-in, our definition of path dependency does not require all participants to think and act in the same way.
Data Analysis
The analysis of the data was performed by matching identified patterns with different types of self-reinforcing mechanisms, as they were described in previous research. Co-authors, independently of each other, tagged identified mechanisms along the characteristics summarized in Table 2 . The first tag was the type of self-reinforcing mechanism (tags: coordination effect, complementarity effect, expectation effect, or investment and learning effect), which was determined based on the definitions of each type as described in the theoretical framework. The second tag was the locus of mechanism, i.e. whether the repeated pattern was related to technology adoption (tag: adoption) or technology development (tag: development). For example, several data sources suggested that incandescent lamps became an evaluation standard of a good lighting in the eyes of consumers. If the sources discussed how this led to consumer loyalty and a repeated choice by consumers to buy incandescent lamps, we would tag this as an adoption-related self-reinforcing mechanism. To the extent that this loyalty made manufacturers reproduce some characteristics of incandescent lamps in other technologies, we would also tag it as a development-related mechanism. The third tag was the direction of influence, i.e. if it occurred within one technology (tag: feedback) or across technologies (tag: externality). The fourth and final tag was the character of influence, i.e. if it reinforced the pattern (tag: positive) or weakened it (tag: negative).
The mechanisms and their tags were compared and discussed, after which a selection was made of a number of mechanisms that were to be discussed in more detail as examples in the article. This selection was made so that to represent different types of mechanisms.
Self-reinforcing Mechanisms in the Lighting Industry

Technological Paths in the Lighting Industry
The electric lighting industry was established in the late nineteenth century with the introduction of the incandescent bulb. In the course of the twentieth century, a number of other types of light sources appeared: halogen lamps, linear fluorescent lamps (LFL) and CFL, high-pressure discharge lamps (including metal halide lamps, low-and Among the three general-level lighting technologies, incandescent bulbs have the lowest purchase price and provide a warm light which is very close to daylight. They are not very energy efficient and have a relatively short service life. Discharge lamps are more energy efficient and have a longer service life compared with incandescent bulbs, but they are more expensive in terms of purchase price and generally provide a colder, bluish light. The latest lighting technology, LED, provides considerable improvements in terms of energy efficiency and service life and the miniature size of the light sources opens up for rich design possibilities. They are, however, still characterized by a very high purchase price compared with other lamp types.
Today, the lighting industry is characterized by a considerable push for more energy-efficient lighting (Ashe et al. 2012) , which recently has led to legislation in several countries aiming at phasing out the incandescent bulb. There is also an ongoing debate with regard to potential changes caused by the appearance of LED lamps (e.g. new business models building on integration between fixtures and light sources).
Examples of Four Types of Self-reinforcing Mechanisms in the Lighting Industry
Coordination Effects
Technology-internal coordination effects in the lighting industry can be seen in a higher availability of incandescent lamps in supermarkets, grocery stores, large department stores and furniture stores (IEA 2006), even after CFL and (later) LED lamps were introduced in the market (until the recent incandescent "ban" in some countries and regions). Since they were more available, incandescent lamps sold better which, in turn, was a reason for the stores to keep them more available. This adoption-related positive feedback of incandescent lamps was mirrored by a negative externality for newer technologies that could not reach end users to the same extent, in spite of being present in the market.
Another technology-internal coordination effect can be seen in the development of CFL lamps that initially suffered from technical and customer acceptance issues. A crucial moment in overcoming these problems was the establishment of harmonized testing and performance specifications as a result of the CFL Harmonization Initiative (OECD/ IEA 2010). Thus, once producers started following the same procedures for CFL testing and compliance, consumer acceptance improved, which further legitimized the use of these harmonized procedures. This development-related positive feedback resulted in a negative externality for competing technologies as it improved the relative advantage of CFLs.
An example of a positive cross-technology coordination effect is the tendency of lamp manufacturers to copy the characteristics and performance of incandescent lamps when developing new technologies. This process is caused by strong customer preferences in favor of the characteristics of incandescent lighting, e.g. low purchase price and excellent color rendering have made incandescent lamps the "evaluation standard" to which other technologies are compared (IEA 2006; Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000) . Due to the high legitimacy of incandescent lamps, other technologies are expected to provide the same performance attributes as incandescent lamps in order to be accepted by the market, even though they have their own distinct advantages (Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000) . 3 Manufacturers therefore make efforts to overcome this problem by making new types of lamps similar to incandescent bulbs across a wide range of performance criteria. For example, CFL lamps have copied luminous flux values (Heidemann et al. 1993) , color performance (LRC 2003) and the shape, size and esthetics (ALG 2012) from incandescent bulbs. Most notably, manufacturers started to produce CFLs enclosed with a glass casing to resemble incandescent bulbs (Iwafune 2000) . LEDs are also increasingly produced as retrofit lamps that copy the visual appearance of incandescent bulbs, in spite of the rich design possibilities that are available for them as a consequence of their semiconductor nature (including integrated lamp-fixture solutions (LEDs Magazine 2005)). The availability of an even wider range of lamps that look and perform like incandescent bulbs further strengthens existing customer preferences. This development-related externality is an example of how the development processes inherent to one technology (incandescent bulbs) result in similar development patterns in other technologies (LFL, CFL and LED) (and back again). It, thus, gives a positive influence across technologies as the development pattern is repeated, rather than weakened. This kind of positive externality clearly goes beyond the logic of positive feedbacks and negative externalities described in the previous literature.
Complementarity Effects
With regard to technology-internal complementarity effects, technology adoption is characterized by a durability of lighting fixtures, which have much longer service lives than the light sources themselves. The importance of existing fixtures is further highlighted by the character of the lighting market, where over 90 percent of the sales of leading manufacturers come from the replacement of existing lamps (Stettler, Leslie, and Bell 2010) . Therefore, users are to a large extent locked in to using the same type of lamp until they replace their existing fixtures (IEA 2006) , and there are few incentives to replace fixtures as long as there are lamps that fit into them. When customers have adopted a particular type of fixture, they are therefore likely to continue to adopt the same type of lamp over and over again (positive feedback for that technology), which implies a negative externality for other lamp technologies. For example, the diffusion of LFLs and halogen lamps was slowed down because they used other fittings than incandescent bulbs and therefore required other fixtures and early CFLs were too long and "bulky" to fit into luminaires designed to match the standard dimensions of incandescent bulbs (IEA 2006; Martinot and Borg 1998; Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000) . The same type of problems currently exists for LED as well, although not only with regard to incandescent bulbs, but also to halogen lamps (spotlights) (cf. Hedekvist 2011). 4 The durability of fixtures has also resulted in cross-technology complementarity effects related to technology development. As mentioned above, newer lamp technologies, e.g. CFL and LED, initially had low sales because they were incompatible with existing fixtures. Instead of just accepting this negative externality, lamp manufacturers responded by miniaturizing newer lamps to make them fit into existing fixtures (IEA 2006; Iwafune 2000; Sathaye and Murtishaw 2004; Weiss, Junginger, and Patel 2008) . For CFLs, the introduction of amalgam technology was key to reducing size (VITO 2009 ). Manufacturers also developed new CFL lamps with screw-based sockets, which were compatible with existing fixtures (in contrast to the pin-based sockets that were used initially). This mechanism shows that a complementary resource associated with one technology can be used by newer technologies as soon as they are adapted, which in turn reinforces the value of the complementary resource and provides further incentives to adapt to them. This is another evidence of positive interaction across technologies: by repeating an established development pattern to make sure that newer lamp technologies can use the same fixtures as older technologies, a synergy is created from which both incandescent and the adapted light sources can benefit.
Expectation Effects
A technology-internal expectation effect related to technology adoption is seen in the sustained loyalty to the incandescent bulb because it is well known or because it is the evaluation standard to which other technologies are compared (Babcock 2009; IEA 2006) . For example, consumers are used to selecting lamps based on the purchase price and performance characteristics of incandescent bulbs (Babcock 2009 ). For example, they tend to compare lamp prices based on purchase prices rather than total service life costs, which works to the disadvantage of CFLs and LEDs as they are much more expensive at first but have lower operating costs (which is not well understood by consumers) (IEA 2006) . A corresponding self-reinforcing mechanism for CFL lamps was not initiated when they were first introduced since the new technology failed to meet customers' expectations. However, a number of demand-side management campaigns in different countries, such as rebate coupons and give-away programs (Iwafune 2000) , eventually stimulated the emergence of an adoption-related positive feedback in terms of an increasing loyalty to CFL lamps. Because of the incentives, consumers started to buy CFL lamps and through this gained more information about the technology and the risks associated with it, which in turn induced further adoption (Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000) . In both these examples, positive feedbacks created mirror negative externalities for all other, competing technologies.
Another technology-internal expectation effect can be seen in the gradual advance of LED technology since the 1960s through the exploitation of a series of market niches. Indicator lights, traffic lights, exit signs and architectural lighting are some examples of 4 The same mechanism can also occur within technological paths. For example, the T5 LFL tube does not fit into fixtures developed for earlier LFLs (the T12 and T8 tubes) and this has slowed down the adoption of T5s (IEA 2006). applications that served as intermediary steps helping LED scale up to the level of general lighting (Sanderson and Simons 2014) . In this self-reinforcing mechanism, each new application contributed to creating a "see-saw dynamic between technological advance pulled by the promise of new markets, and the opening of new markets pushed by technological advance" (Haitz and Tsao 2003 in Sanderson et al. 2008 , 1739 . This development-related positive feedback also created a negative externality for other lighting technologies that were previously used in corresponding applications and had to face an increasing competition.
Cross-technology expectation effects manifest themselves, for example, as a sustained ambition in the lighting industry to increase energy efficiency, which was initiated while developing incandescent lamps and further reproduced for every new lighting technology. This is shown by two development trends (see Table 3 ). On the one hand, new technologies have tended to be more energy efficient than previous ones (see Column 2), and have also been positioned as potential substitutes for incandescent bulbs (e.g. Burgin and Edwards 1970) . On the other hand, gradual improvements in energy efficiency have also been achieved over time within each technology (compare Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 ).
These two trends could be seen as a natural development trajectory of the industry, but a closer analysis suggests that a different kind of logic is behind this process. First, energy efficiency is only the most critical performance issue for incandescent bulbs. Other technologies had their own problems, for example, flickering and modulation (fluorescent lighting) (Berman et al. 1997; Bruxdrett, Grifft, and Boyce 1973; Veitch and McColl 1995; Wilkins and Clark 1990) and color rendering (LEDs) (Alvi et al. 2011; Pousset, Rougié , and Razet 2010; Sá ndor and Schanda 2006; Smet et al. 2012; Szabó , Bodrogi, and Schanda 2009) . Second, improved energy efficiency was not what the consumers asked for; the pressure to increase energy efficiency instead came mainly from policy in the form of investments in research of more efficient lighting technologies, new regulations (e.g. the ban of incandescent lamps) and public awareness campaigns (Ashe et al. 2012) . New technologies, therefore, had to copy the performance attributes of incandescent lamps, even though they had better energy efficiency characteristics. Third and finally, the theoretical efficacy limit of white light (approx. 250 lm/W) has been known for a long time (Willoughby 1974) , which from a pragmatic point of view should have warned the industry that even if improvements would be made with regard to (2000), Navigant Consulting (2012) and Scholand and Dillon (2012) . energy efficiency, there would still be a clear technological "ceiling" that could not be overcome without compromising color differentiation. The sustained focus on energy efficiency in the lighting industry is, thus, not the result of a natural technology-push or market-pull dynamics, but rather a self-reinforcing mechanism. A development pattern was reproduced largely because of a technological weakness specifically associated with the incandescent bulb, which was targeted by policy pressures in favor of more energy efficiency lighting and further reinforced as all other technologies started to achieve higher levels of energy efficiency. The existence of a common development pattern across a number of technologies again shows the possibility of non-negative technology interaction, i.e. positive externalities.
Investment and Learning Effects
Technology-internal investment and learning effects related to technology adoption can be seen in the form of economies of scale and experience that have existed for incandescent lamps throughout the twentieth century. These have given incandescent bulbs a competitive advantage in terms of lower production costs and, consequently, higher adoption rates than other technologies, which in turn creates further learning effects (i.e. a positive feedback with a negative externality for other technologies). However, newer technologies have their own learning effects. Studies of CFL cost dynamics show learning rates of roughly 10-20 per cent for CFLs (Weiss et al. 2010) , and an even higher speed of cost and performance improvement (20-25 per cent) can be seen for LEDs (Gould and Cheng 2011) .
With regard to technology development, technology-internal investment effects are seen in the form of the sunk cost of large facilities that are quite specialized for each lamp type. For example, incandescent (and discharge) lamp manufacturing involves a process technology that requires specialized equipment, while LED lamp manufacturing is to a large extent based on an electronic assembly technology which implies a crucial difference with respect to production facilities required. For all technologies, there is a need to build large from the start to be able to produce at scale, so a new plant incurs substantial costs (Gould and Cheng 2011) . Once an investment in advanced manufacturing equipment for one lamp technology has been made, it therefore tends to be exploited to the full extent and new investments tend to be made to support, rather than replace it. 5 This implies positive feedbacks for technologies manufactured in existing plants, with a mirror negative externality for other technologies.
Cross-technology learning effects related to technology development are demonstrated by "development loops" between different lighting technologies. For example, patent data show an intense cross-referencing between the main patent classes associated with incandescent bulbs and discharge lamps, respectively. The cross-referencing pattern between these two lighting technologies shows that technological activities can go forth and back between them several times within the same refer-5 In addition, closing down existing plants is also associated with high costs; for example, following the shift from incandescent bulbs to CFLs Philips Lighting closed 13 of its 20 incandescent bulb factories in the period of 2001 (Provoost 2009 ) and spent 500 million Euro between 2008 and 2010 on restructuring its production facilities (Stettler, Leslie, and Bell 2010) . ence chain. 6 This is an indicator of mutual learning across the two technologies, where the technological advances initiated in incandescent lighting continue in discharge lighting, after which the results are further used in incandescent lighting and so forth. Thus, this is one more example that shows that cross-path interactions (externalities) are not necessarily negative since a common and repeated pattern of activities (technology development based on the same patents) is seen for both involved technologies.
Summary Analysis
Our first research question was what kind of self-reinforcing mechanisms can be present in a multi-technology industry. The empirical analysis shows that all four types of self-reinforcing mechanisms mentioned in the previous literature have also been present in the lighting industry (see Table 4 ). We can thus confirm our suggestion that self-reinforcing mechanisms can and do exist also in multi-technology industries such as lighting, in spite of the fact that there is no technological lock-in to a single path. We can also confirm that the typology suggested in the previous literature is useful for identifying and categorizing them.
As in the previous literature (e.g. Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013; Pierson 2000) , we found technology-internal positive feedbacks for several of the lighting technologies. Some of these were adoption-related mechanisms (e.g. availability in stores and durability of fixtures) that resulted in repeated decisions by customers to adopt a particular technology-in this case primarily incandescent bulbs-whereas other positive feedbacks were development related (e.g. sunk costs) and resulted in repeated decisions by manufacturers to develop a certain technology or specific performance characteristics. As described in the previous literature (e.g. Vergne and Durand 2010) , positive feedbacks within one technology were reflected by cross-technology negative externalities for other lamp technologies.
However, in contrast to the previous literature on path dependency, we found selfreinforcing mechanisms that had the character of positive influences across technologies and therefore could be described as positive externalities. These resulted in a repeated pattern of development of features primarily associated with incandescent bulbs, but "inherited" by later lamp technologies, which further strengthened the incandescent bulb's status as an evaluation standard. Interestingly, these positive externalities were related primarily to technology development, rather than to technology adoption. This shows the importance of explicitly considering development-related mechanisms in order not to leave out crucial aspects of cross-path interactions. Moreover, examples of positive externalities were found that represented all the four types of self-reinforcing mechanisms described in the previous literature. Our study has, thus, expanded the existing empirical evidence of self-reinforcing mechanisms (cf. Araujo and Harrison 2002; Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013; Sydow, Schreyö gg, and Koch 2009; Sydow et al. 2012) . The existence of both negative and positive externalities also holds part of the answer to our second research question, i.e. the role of self-reinforcing mechanisms in enabling the survival of several alternative technologies and avoiding technological lockin to one single path. Whereas the previous literature has shown that self-reinforcing mechanisms at different levels can interact with each other to drive a path forward (cf. interaction between local and population-level mechanisms as discussed by Dobusch and Schü ßler 2013) , our empirical study shows that mutual reinforcements can take place also across different paths, i.e. that paths can have positive as well as negative influences on each other.
Whereas negative cross-path influences in the form of negative externalities have been discussed in previous path dependency literature (e.g. Page 2006; Vergne and Durand 2010) , the existence of positive externalities has not been explicitly acknowledged there. The existence of positive externalities suggests that one reason why coexisting paths do not outcompete each other in multi-technology industries is that positive developments in one technology spills over to other technologies. Adding this perspective de-emphasizes technology competition and instead recognizes the advantages of potential synergies in terms of, e.g., shared resources. This implies that even when two (or more) technologies compete in the same market, their relationship is not necessarily purely competitive but can also involve elements of symbiosis or commensalism (cf. Hillman and Sandé n 2008). Because of this, we suggest that positive externalities have the potential to (partly) balance out negative externalities mirroring the positive feedbacks associated with established paths (as in the case of the incandescent bulb), which allows new technological paths (such as CFL or LED) to emerge without outcompeting (or being outcompeted by) the established path.
It should be noted here that the term "positive" does not necessarily imply that all the interacting technologies are successful in the market. It is positive in the sense that it leads to a repeated pattern, i.e. experience acquired within one technology is reused in other technologies, but this pattern might in fact be detrimental to the further development or diffusion of one or all of the interacting technologies. For example, a decision to allocate resources to develop a particular feature of the technology might lead to the identification of new technical problems, which in turn leads to new decisions to allocate resources to the same line of development, but this does not necessarily mean that the technical problems will ever be solved or that the new feature will be valued in the market. However, when adoption-related self-reinforcing mechanisms are concerned, positive mechanisms imply repeated adoption decisions and, thus, also some kind of success for the technology in question.
We might illustrate these additions to previous path dependency theory by means of a two-by-two matrix, where we distinguish between four categories of self-reinforcing mechanisms based on whether the character of influence is positive or negative and whether the direction of influence is technology-internal or cross-technology (see Figure 1 ). To repeat some definitions made previously, positive mechanisms reinforce the pattern of adoption or development, whereas negative mechanisms weaken that pattern. Technology-internal mechanisms (feedbacks) imply that developments in one technology influence future developments in that technology, whereas cross-technology mechanisms (externalities) imply that developments in one technology influence future developments in other technologies.
As mentioned above, we found evidence in our empirical study of positive feedbacks, negative externalities and positive externalities. The existence of negative feedbacks seems logic from a theoretical point of view, but could not be fully confirmed in our study. We did, however, find some indications of negative feedbacks in the case of CFL. When first introduced, CFL lamps suffered from a number of quality issues, such as flickering, noise, long warm-up times and bluish light, which harmed reputation of this technology (IEA 2006) . Further, when large producers had solved these issues, CFL technology attracted low-cost manufacturers that started selling, again, low-quality products, which, given previous quality problems, reinforced a negative image of CFLs in the eyes of consumers (OECD/IEA 2010). Thus, a negative pattern was repeated which led to a long and complicated market penetration process. In the case of CFL, both quality and legitimacy issues were addressed with the help of demand-side management programs and testing procedures (IEA 2006; OECD/IEA 2010), but this example shows that failure of some technologies can be explained in terms of path dependency, though not through positive feedbacks and negative externalities related to established technologies, but through negative feedbacks related to a new technology. That is a topic for further research as well as a question whether such negative feedbacks are reflected in the form of positive externalities on the remaining alternatives (in the same way as positive feedbacks are usually reflected on other technologies in the form of negative externalities).
Another interesting topic for further research is the role of agency in establishing positive externalities, especially to the extent it concerns technology development. On the one hand, our findings support the perspective that actors are able to strategically manage self-reinforcing mechanisms (Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010) . For example, the lamp manufacturers very deliberately adapted new technologies to mimic the incandescent bulb in order for them to benefit from existing positive feedback mechanisms. Thus, this might suggest that development-related self-reinforcing mechanisms are at least partly the result of conscious efforts of actors. On the other hand, manufacturers are not entirely free in choosing their course of actions. For example, the decision to adapt later technologies to mimic incandescent lamps was both caused by path dependency at the adoption side and further reinforced some of the previously existing mechanisms. Therefore, distinguishing path-breaking choices of actors from path dependent ones requires careful consideration and further empirical investigation.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to investigate what kind of self-reinforcing mechanisms can be present in multi-technology industries and explain how paths can coexist and interact in a context of self-reinforcement and, ultimately, path dependency. Through a historical study of the lighting industry, we have shown that the four types of self-reinforcing mechanisms that were described in the previous literature, i.e. coordination effects, complementarity effects, expectation effects and investment and learning effects, can also be found in multi-technology industries. We have also contributed to the previous path dependency literature by explicitly distinguishing between self-reinforcing mechanisms related to technology adoption and technology development, respectively, and by doing so, we have highlighted that self-reinforcement can characterize both technology users and suppliers. Further, we have provided examples of technology-internal positive feedbacks as well as cross-technology externalities.
Whereas the previous findings apply to all types of industries, the main contribution of this paper is that it captures additional processes that seem to be specific to multitechnology industries, i.e. the existence of positive cross-technology externalities. While the previous literature has considered negative externalities as the only possible form of technology interaction, in this study, we have provided evidence of positive interaction between technologies. Because of these positive externalities, the same technology development patterns were reproduced across technologies, which is why advancements in one technology could contribute to corresponding advancements in other technologies.
An implication of this is that multi-technology industries can be path dependenteven though they are not locked in to one technology, but rather characterized by the coexistence of several technologies. Indeed, our analysis suggests that their multi-technology character is partly due to cross-technology self-reinforcing mechanisms in the form of positive externalities, which create a symbiotic relationship between technologies and make it possible for several technologies to survive and coexist even in a context of path dependency. One might even go as far as saying that multi-technology industries are able to be innovative and add new technologies to already existing ones not in spite of path dependency, but, at least partly, because of path dependency.
This indicates that positive externalities at least to some extent are beneficial for the development of established industries. They make it possible to sustain a certain technology variety and prevent lock-in to (inferior) technologies. According to the evolutionary theory of technical change, this is positive for innovation (and, in consequence, for economic development) since it creates conditions for new combinations and resource synergies to occur (cf. Carlsson and Eliasson 2003) . However, some of the positive externalities found in the lighting industry were due to manufactures imitating the characteristics and performance of the dominant design (the incandescent bulb) when developing new technologies. If this is a more general phenomenon, positive externalities might prevent more disruptive innovations (e.g. integrated LED solutions) from gaining a foot-hold in the industry, which in the long run might have detrimental effects on industrial development and growth and might prevent an industry from fully exploiting the potential of new technologies. 7 With regard to potential benefits of positive externalities and sustained technological variety, an interesting question for further research is what enables such non-competitive technology interactions to occur. Based on the evidence from the lighting industry, we can suggest that one possible answer might be the existence of a large number of lighting applications that prioritize different performance criteria (cf. Menanteau and Lefebvre 2000) . Furthermore, leading industry actors tend to have a broad portfolio of technologies they produce as well as applications they serve which contributes to an environment where potential cross-technology spillovers are encouraged while lock-in can be avoided. However, a comprehensive analysis of preconditions for positive externalities requires further investigation that involves cross-industry comparisons.
One might suggest that the lighting industry could be locked in to three paths, much in the same way as regions or countries can be locked in to a particular configuration of industrial specialization (Martin and Sunley 2006) . Although this is a theoretical possibility, the emergence of LED as a new lighting technology, which builds on (and interacts with) previous older technologies but is based on a fundamentally different lighting principle, speaks against an overall lock-in in this case.
